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In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia,1 the United States Supreme
Court narrowly voted to invalidate all death penalty statutes then in
existence. While each Justice wrote a separate opinion, the death pen-
alty statutes were criticized repeatedly for allowing unguided discretion.
This, it was believed, led to the imposition of death sentences in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner. Within four years of Furman, thirty-five
states had enacted new death penalty statutes. These new statutes were
of two general types: those legislating a mandatory death sentence for
everyone convicted of a certain crime and those specifying new rules to
guide juries and judges in deciding who should receive a death sentence.
Five of the new statutes were reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court in 1976. The Court held that mandatory capital punishment
statutes were unconstitutional, 2 but it upheld those containing guided
discretion provisions. 3 The history and content of these decisions have
received detailed analysis elsewhere.4
* We would like to thank Ronald L. Akers, Brian Forst, Samuel R. Gross, Lonn Lanza-
Kaduce, and Charles W. Thomas for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Jane
Pendergast and Alan Agresti for their statistical advice. The research was supported in part
by funds provided by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1982
meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems in San Francisco.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Florida; Postdoctoral Fel-
low, University of Wisconsin, 1977-79; Ph.D., Purdue University, 1977; M.A., Eastern Michi-
gan University, 1974; B.A., Michigan State University, 1972.
*** Graduate Student, School of Criminology, Florida State University; M.A. (expected),
Florida State University, 1983; B.A., University of Colorado, 1975.
1 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
3 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
4 See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (1973); D. PANNICK, JUDICIAL REvIEw OF
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Florida was the first state to enact a post-Furman death penalty stat-
ute. Immediately after the Furman decision, a special session of the Flor-
ida legislature was called for the sole purpose of enacting new capital
punishment legislation. The new law, unlike Florida's earlier statute,
specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances to give to the jury
and judge in deciding whether to impose death. This decision was to be
made in a sentencing hearing held after determination of guilt. A sec-
ond feature of this legislation which distinguished it from the earlier
Florida death penalty statute was its provision for an automatic, direct
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court for every person condemned to
death. While the pre-Furman statute permitted an appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court, the court could not reduce the sentence as excessive as
long as it was within statutory guidelines.5 In part because of the
mandatory appeal provision, the 1972 Florida law was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in its 1976 decisions.
6
According to a former Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
death penalty cases currently consume thirty-five to forty percent of the
court's total working time.7 By the beginning of 1982, the court had
rendered decisions in 146 direct appeals, and the death sentence was
affirmed in about half of the cases. The purpose of this study is to iden-
tify both legal and extra-legal correlates of the Florida Supreme Court's
decisions. More specifically, we are interested in (A) the degree to which
the state supreme court has achieved the goals of consistency and fair-
ness in capital sentencing, and (B) whether the extra-legal factors of de-
fendant's race and/or victim's sex correlate with the court's decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
Under Florida's post-Furman death penalty statute, the ultimate re-
sponsibility for imposing the death sentence rests with the trial judge.
Although a jury vote is taken on the question of imposing a death sen-
tence, this vote is advisory and can be overridden by the judge.8 Any
cases that result in a death sentence are then automatically reviewed by
THE DEATH PENALTY (1982); Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under post-
Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Dix,Appellate Review of the Decision to
Impose Death, 68 GEo. LJ. 97 (1979); Lanza-Kaduce, Formality, Neutrality, and Coal-Rationality:
The Legay of Weber in Analyzing Legal Thought, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 533 (1982).
5 Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?, 64
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973).
6 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
7 Gainesville Sun, Aug. 24, 1981, at B1, col. 5.
8 "Alabama, Indiana, and Florida are the only states with laws that allow a judge to
overrule a jury's recommendation of life in prison and sentence a convicted murderer to die.
Alabama judges have done it twice. Indiana judges have done it twice. Florida judges have
done it 70 times." Miami News, Nov. 19, 1982, at IA, col. 3.
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the state supreme court. While precise details of this appellate review
process are not specified in the statute, the Florida Supreme Court out-
lined its function in State v. Dixon:
Review by this Court guarantees that the reasons present in one case will
reach a similar result to that reached under similar circumstances in an-
other case. No longer will one man die and another live on the basis of
race, or a woman live and a man die on the basis of sex. 9
In its review of the Florida statute in Proffitt v. Florida' 0 the United States
Supreme Court, with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting, con-
cluded that the state supreme court review would ensure evenhanded
and consistent application of the death penalty: "Finally, the Florida
statute has a provision designed to ensure that the death penalty will not
be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants.
The Supreme Court of Florida reviews each death sentence to ensure
that similar results are reached in similar cases."'I The court also stated
that all death penalty cases in Florida are "conscientiously reviewed by
a court which, because of its statewide jurisdiction, can ensure consis-
tency, fairness, and rationality in the evenhanded operation of the state
law." 2 The data presented below, therefore, are useful in evaluating the
degree to which the state supreme court has been successful in adhering
to these standards.
The above standards suggest that, to achieve consistency in the im-
position of the death penalty, the state supreme court must recognize
and correct any systematic biases that might be introduced at" earlier
stages in the criminal justice process. Evidence gathered from the years
before' 3 and after Furman '4 has shown that both race of defendant and
race of victim are associated with the probability of receiving the death
sentence. In Florida, black defendants, especially those with white vic-
tims, are more likely to be indicted for first degree murder, and once
indicted are more likely to be sentenced to death.' 5 Thus, if the state
supreme court is effectively removing racial biases in the administration
9 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
10 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
11 Id. at 258.
12 Id. at 259-60.
13 W. BOWERS, ExECUTIONS IN AMERICA, (1974); Garfinkle, Research Note on Inter- and
Intra-RacialHomicides, 27 Soc. FORCES 369 (1949); Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion,
and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119 (1973).
14 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 4; Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity andJugy Packing:
Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982); Radelet,
Racial Characteristics and the Imposition ofthe Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918 (1981); Zeisel,
Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456
(1981).
15 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 4; Radelet, supra note 14; L. Foley, The Effects of Race on
the Imposition of the Death Penalty (Sept. 1979) (unpublished manuscript).
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of capital punishment, we would expect the court to be less likely to
affirm the death sentences for those groups of defendants who, given
similar legal circumstances, are significantly more likely to be sentenced
to death in the trial courts.
On the other hand, it is possible that appellate courts do not re-
move and may even widen disparities in the imposition of capital pun-
ishment. Few studies have focused specifically on correlates of decisions
made after the death sentence has been imposed by the trial court, 16 and
only one has been conducted since Furman.17 These studies show that
decisions made after the trial do not correct the earlier arbitrariness; in
fact, racial disparities are exacerbated. In one study, Wolfgang, Kelly,
and Nolde examined the records of 412 persons sentenced to death for
first degree murder in Pennsylvania between 1914 and 1958. The au-
thors found that 82.77% of these men eventually were executed and that
17.23% of the sentences were commuted. 18 White offenders were signifi-
cantly more likely than black offenders to have their death sentences
commuted, even after controlling for whether or not the homicide was
classified as a felony murder. In fact, of the 308 cases for which com-
plete information was available, nearly three times more white felony
murderers than black felony murderers had their sentences commuted.19
A second study examined records of the 660 convicted capital offenders
sent to death row in North Carolina between 1909 and 1954.20 Of the
650 cases reported, 42.94% of the 170 whites were eventually executed,
compared to 57.92% of the 480 blacks.
2 '
Between the 1972 Furman decision and October 1983, eight Ameri-
cans have been executed, four in what have been termed consensual ex-
ecutions. 22 Other condemned persons continue to pursue their appeals.
Thus, too few cases have reached final disposition to permit replication
of the above studies. Enough cases have passed through the mandatory
direct appeals, however, to allow analysis of decisions made at this stage.
The Florida Supreme Court has decided more direct appeals in death
penalty cases than any other state court. The large number of decisions
provides an excellent opportunity to examine post-sentencing outcomes.
16 W. Bowers, supra note 13; C. MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 369
(1940).
17 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 4.
18 Wolfgang, Kelly, & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissiins to
Death Row, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 301 (1962).
19 Id. at 307, Table IV.
20 Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165 (1957).
21 Id. at 169, computed from Table 7.
22 The eight post-Furman executions were: Gary Gilmore, Utah, Jan. 17, 1977; John
Spenkelink, Fla., May 25, 1979; Jesse Bishop, Nev., Oct. 22, 1979; Steven Judy, Ind., Mar. 19,
1981; Frank Coppola, Va., Aug. 10, 1982; Charles Brooks, Tex., Dec. 7, 1982; John Evans,
Ala., Apr. 22, 1983; Jimmie Lee Gray, Miss., Sept. 2, 1983.
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III. METHOD
Data were gathered on all reported Florida Supreme Court deci-
sions in death penalty cases during the period from January 1, 1973 to
December 31, 1981. Only direct appeals were examined. Decisions
made by the Florida Supreme Court in appeals for stays of execution
were not considered, as this part of the appellate process is not explicitly
charged with ensuring consistency and proportionality.
23
Cases where defendants received multiple death sentences for mul-
tiple victims were treated as one case if the sentences were imposed after
one trial, appealed in one brief, and decided as one case by the state
supreme court. Three men had two separate cases decided. Each was
indicted and tried separately for two murders. Separate appeal briefs
were filed, separate oral arguments were held, and the court delivered
two separate decisions for each man. We treated these as six indepen-
dent cases.
Five men went through the process of direct appeal two times. In
each case, a favorable decision for the defendant by the Florida
Supreme Court was followed by reimposition of the death sentence by
the trial court and a second direct review by the supreme court. These
also were treated as ten separate decisions.
Using these procedures, we identified a total of 146 decisions made
on direct appeal for 138 defendants. Because of our interest in identify-
ing demographic correlates of the decisions, the single case with a. female
defendant was deleted. This reduced the final population to 145 cases.
The variables used in the analysis were coded as follows. First, the
defendant's and victim's races, victim's sex, and the trial jury's sentence
recommendation were constructed as a series of (0,1) dichotomous vari-
23 Also not included were the cases remanded for resentencing under the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). In this decision the Court
held that a trial judge's use of material relevant to sentencing without notifying the defendant
was a violation of due process. All information used by a trial judge to determine sentences,
the Court ruled, must be presented to the defendant and his counsel. After Gardner, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court wrote to all trial judges who had sentenced people to death and asked if
they had based their decisions on any information not known to the defendant. Several con-
demned men independently appealed their cases, alleging Gardner violations. Seven cases that
had previously been affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court were eventually sent back to the
trial courts for resentencing because of Gardner violations. In all of these cases, the men were
resentenced to death and the state supreme court reaffirmed the sentences. Because the Flor-
ida Supreme Court rehearings did not review the cases fully, and their decisions concerned
one limited issue, see, e.g., Funchess v. State, 399 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1981), we excluded these
post-Gardner decisions from the analysis.
Two cases presented a rather different situation. In these, the Florida Supreme Court
remanded the cases for Gardner violations at the same time that it conducted its direct review
of the convictions and sentences. It was strongly implied that the only flaw was that of a
Gardner violation and that, absent that mistake, the cases would have been affirmed. These
two cases were thus coded as receiving affirmations.
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ables where 1 represented black, male, and death or waived jury recom-
mendation. 24 Second, the number of murdered victims was coded as an
interval variable. In three cases the defendant had been found guilty of
the rape of a child, rather than murder, and thus the number of mur-
dered victims was coded as zero.25 Third, a series of dummy variables
was constructed to represent the type of trial and appellate attorney.
These variables allowed us to assess the predictive power of each in-
dependent variable after controlling for the effects of the type of attor-
ney. One pair represented private attorneys, and a second pair
represented court-appointed attorneys. A third pair, representing trial
and appellate public defenders, was the omitted category for the regres-
sion analysis, thereby becoming the standard against which we com-
pared the other two attorney types. Finally, we examined several two-
way interaction terms. One of these interactions represented the prod-
uct of defendant's race and. victim's sex and is included in the final
model. The outcome variable was then coded (0 = affirmed and 1 =
sent back to trial court for new trial or sentence, o sentence reduced to
life by the supreme court).
2 6
The statistical technique used for analysis was multiple regression,
which allows researchers to model changes in a dependent variable us-
ing a series of predictor variables.2 7 With a large sample size, such as
the one used in this study, the estimates are approximately normally
distributed. 28 The F statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that a par-
24 In five cases, the defendants waived the right to a jury during their sentencing hearings.
25 After these three individual cases had been reviewed, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
that the death sentence for the rape of a child was cruel and unusual punishment. Buford v.
State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The Florida law had
allowed a death sentence to be imposed upon defendants 18 or older who were found guilty of
raping a child 11 or younger.
26 We attempted to identify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found in each
case by the trial judge, and approved or disapproved by the Florida Supreme Court during its
review. Such data are needed to ascertain if similar decisions are made by the Florida
Supreme Court in cases with roughly similar circumstances. The court has recognized the
great importance of these factors in its decisions, writing in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8
(Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974): "The most important safeguard presented in the
Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is the propounding of the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances which must be determinative of the sentence imposed." Given the court's own assess-
ment of the crucial importance of these circumstances, it is noteworthy that the court's
written opinions often omit any mention of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or are
ambivalent about the circumstances under discussion. Such omissions are more common in
the court's earlier decisions than in the more recent ones. Careful reading of all post-Furman
decisions revealed insufficient data with which to analyze aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
27 For general discussion of regression, see A. AGRESTI & B. AGRE TI, STATISTICAL
METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 321-405 (1979); J. NETER & W. WASSERMAN, AP-
PLIED LINEAR STATISTICAL MODELS (1974).
28 The ordinary least squares (linear) regression model reported in this Article was cor-
pared to a similar model using logistic multiple regression. Only minor differences in signi -
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ticular beta equals zero, was used to assess the unique contribution of
each variable to the equation's overall predictive capacity.
IV. RESULTS
Of the 145 death sentence cases examined, 75 (51.7%) were af-
firmed by the Florida Supreme Court. Of the seventy cases resulting in
a favorable decision for the defendant, 42.86% of the men were resen-
tenced to life imprisonment, 25.71% were returned to the trial court for
new sentencing, and 31.43% were returned for new trials. We labelled
these non-affirmed decisions as "favorable," although some of the men
returned to the trial courts were or eventually will be resentenced to
death.
In the first stage of the analysis, we found that several variables and
interaction terms did not contribute substantially to the prediction of
the decision, and they therefore were deleted. These included whether
the defendant was employed at the time of the crime, whether the de-
fendant was offered a plea bargain at the original trial, his original plea,
the length of time between the trial and the supreme court decision, and
the victim's and defendant's ages. Since only eleven of the 145 defend-
ants had black victims (7.59%), it also was necessary to delete this varia-
ble. The lack of cases in this population with black victims reflects the
fact that, given similar circumstances, defendants in Florida with black
victims are much less likely than defendants with white victims to be
sentenced to death.
2 9
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the vari-
ables. The means of the dichotomous variables can also be interpreted
as the proportion of the sample coded as 1. Thus, 72% waived the jury
recommendation or the jury recommended death, 59% had male vic-
tims, 41% of the cases had black defendants, 19% had a private trial
attorney, and 48% received a favorable supreme court ruling. The in-
tercorrelations between these variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 3 reveals that after controlling for the effects of the type of
trial and appellate attorney, there are five statistically significant in-
dependent predictors of the supreme court decisions. Each of two
strongest predictors, jury recommendation and the number of victims,
has some legal relevance. Defendants receiving a jury recommendation
cance levels for each variable were found, none of which affect the conclusions. Over the
ranges of independent variables, the logistic model produces a fit which is close to linear. For
simplicity, we report only the results of the linear model because it has been used widely in
the literature and thus is easier to interpret. For comparison of the linear and logistic regres-
sion models, and a discussion of the similarity of statistical estimates they provide, see Swaf-
ford, Three Parametric Techniquesfor Contingeney Table Analysis: A Nontechnical Commentacy, 45 AM.
Soc. REV. 664 (1980).




MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (N= 145)
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Variables Mean Standard Deviation
Jury Recommendation .72 .45
N of Victims 1.26 .79
Defendant's Race X Victim's Sex .25 .43
Victim's Sex .59 .49
Defendant's Race .41 .49
Trial Court-Appointed Attorney .39 .49
Trial Private Attorney .19 .39
Appeal Court-Appointed Attorney .30 .46
Appeal Private Attorney .12 .32
Supreme Court Decision .48 .50
TABLE 2
ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONSa
A B C D E F G H I J
A. Jury Recommendation
B. N of Victims -. 141 -
C. Defendant's Race X Victim's Sex .042 .194 -
D. Victim's Sex -. 021 .151 .476 -
E. Defendant's Race .021 .116 .694 .029 -
F. Trial Court-Appointed Attorney -. 005 .132 .200 .225 .093 -
G. Trial Private Attorney -. 132 -. 024 .012 .072 -. 072 -. 379 -
H. Appeal Court-Appointed Attorney .081 -. 162 .142 .058 .064 .308 .070 -
I. Appeal Private Attorney -. 152 .096 -. 061 -. 091 .004 -. 201 .431 -. 241 -
J. Supreme Court Decision -. 252 -. 181 .020 -. 071 -. 042 .027 .070 -. 067 .120 -
a With 145 cases, the absolute value of the correlation coefficient must exceed .163 for signif-
icance at the .05 level.




Variables (standard error) F Probability
Jury Recommendation -. 30 11.54 .00
(.09)
N of Victims -. 17 10.86 .00
(.05)
Defendant's Race X Victim's Sex .40 5.99 .02
(.17)
Victim's sex -. 22 4.28 .04
(.11)
Defendant's race -. 25 3.77 .05
(.13)
Trial Court-Appointed Attorney .14 2.11 .15
(.10)
Trial Private Attorney .06 .23 .63
(.13)
Appeal Court-Appointed Attorney -. 15 2.29 .13
(.10)
Appeal Private Attorney .13 .77 .38
(.14)
Constant 1.01
a See text for coding. R 2 = .177.
of life imprisonment rather than death are the most likely to receive a
favorable supreme court decision. The Florida Supreme Court has writ-
ten repeatedly that ajury's recommendation must be given great consid-
eration.30 In addition, the fewer the number of victims, the greater the
defendant's chances for a favorable decision.
Three extra-legal variables also have significant unique effects in
predicting the supreme court's decisions. These variables are defendant's
race, victim's sex, and the interaction between defendant's race and vic-
tim's sex. The significance of the interaction term indicates that it must
be considered concurrently with the two independent variables; that is,
the impact of defendant's race varies with victim's sex, and the impact
of victim's sex varies with defendant's race. Recall that the variables
were coded as 1 for black defendants, male victims, and a favorable de-
cision. To compare differences across the four categories of defendant's
30 Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1979); Cooper v. State, 366 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976);
Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
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race and victim's sex, the value of the variable was multiplied by the
unstandardized regression coefficient b in Table 3. For white defend-
ants with male victims, the score was zero times the b for defendant's
race in Table 3 plus 1 times the b for victim's sex, or -. 22. For whites
with female victims, both b's were multiplied by zero for a score of zero.
For blacks with male victims, we added the b for race (-.25), the b for
victim's sex (-.22), and the interaction term times the product of the
two variables (.40 times 1) for a total of -. 07. A black with a female
victim has a score of -. 25 for defendant's race plus zero for victim's sex,
or -. 25. Comparing these we see that given a male victim, white de-
fendants have a. 15 higher probability of affirmation than black defend-
ants (-.22 minus -. 07). Given a female victim, the probability of
affirmation is .25 less for whites than blacks. Similarly, given a white
defendant, cases with male victims are .22 more likely to be affirmed
than cases with female victims; given a black defendant, cases with male
victims are .18 less likely to be affirmed than cases with female victims.
The magnitude of these differences indicates the substantive importance
of these findings.
One possible explanation for the above patterns is that the vari-
ables might be spuriously related to the supreme court's decisions be-
cause of differences in the type of defense attorney. For example, if
black defendants were more (or less) likely than whites to be represented
by a public defender, the relationship between defendant's race and the
supreme court decision could be explained by differences in attorney
type. To dismiss these possibilities and thus narrow the range of possible
interpretations, the measures of attorney type were retained as control
variables in the final model. They provide scant evidence that the type
of trial or appellate attorney significantly affects the supreme court's de-
cisions. While those defendants with a court-appointed trial attorney
are slightly more likely and those with a court-appointed appellate at-
torney are slightly less likely to receive a favorable decision than those
with analogous public defenders, these differences could occur by
chance (p <.15 and .13, respectively). Thus, the type of trial or appel-
late attorney appears to make only a small difference in the state
supreme court decisions, and this difference is controlled for in assessing
the effects of other variables in the model.
V. DISCUSSION
Since nearly half of the death sentences reviewed on direct appeal
are reversed, it is clear that the Florida Supreme Court believes that the
trial courts frequently make serious errors in their imposition of death
sentences. Further, this rate of reversal indicates that the state supreme
[Vol. 74
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court is reviewing the death penalty cases carefully rather than simply
rubber-stamping the trial judge's determination.
The strongest predictor of a favorable Florida Supreme Court deci-
sion is a jury recommendation of life imprisonment rather than death.
In a case in which the trial judge had disregarded the jury's recommen-
dation of life, the court held: "In order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence
of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ."'3 ' Thus, the trial judge must present strong evi-
dence in the sentencing memorandum to the state supreme court to jus-
tify his or her decision to override the jury recommendation. Thirteen
of the forty-one cases (31.71%) in which the jury had recommended life
did not result in a favorable supreme court decision. Thus, a jury rec-
ommendation of life is by no means a guarantee that the Florida
Supreme Court will render a decision favorable to the defendant. In
twenty-five of the twenty-eight cases (89.29%) with a jury recommenda-
tion of life and a favorable decision, the supreme court's decision was to
reduce the penalty to life. In fact, of the thirty cases in which the
supreme court resentenced the defendant to life, twenty-five (83.33%)
received jury recommendations of life imprisonment after their original
trials.
The supreme court is less likely to find errors at the trial or sentenc-
ing stages as the number of victims increases. This result was obtained
partly because three of the death sentences reduced to life by the
supreme court were for defendants convicted of the rape of a child
(coded as zero homicide victims) rather than murder. The incriminat-
ing evidence might also be stronger as the number of victims increases.
Furthermore, because one role of the supreme court review is to reverse
sentences of those whose crimes make the death penalty relatively exces-
sive, it is not surprising that the number of victims is inversely associated
with the probability of a favorable decision.
The final three predictors of the supreme court decisions are de-
fendant's race, victim's sex, and the interaction between victim's sex and
defendant's race. A zero order cross-classification shows that white de-
fendants are slightly more likely to receive a favorable decision than
black defendants, and those with female victims are slightly more likely
to receive a favorable decision than those with male victims. Overall,
forty-three out of eighty-six (50.00%) cases with white defendants and
thirty-two out of fifty-nine (54.24%) cases with black defendants resulted
in affirmation. The impact of defendant's race, however, is significantly
modified by victim's sex, and vice versa. We found that 39.13% of the
31 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
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twenty-three convicted blacks with female victims received a favorable
supreme court decision, whereas 50% of the thirty-six blacks convicted of
killing a man received positive outcomes. This pattern reverses with
white defendants. Of the thirty-six white defendant/female victim ap-
peals, 61.11% resulted in a favorable ruling, while only 42% of the fifty
white defendant/male victim appeals had similar results.
The twenty-three cases of black defendant and female victim con-
stituted the category least likely to receive a favorable decision. Twenty
of these cases had white victims; twelve of these twenty were affirmed.
The disproportionate use of capital punishment and harsh sentences to
punish black male defendants with white female victims has been par-
ticularly well documented for rape.32 The above results indicate that a
possibility remains that capital punishment is applied disproportion-
ately to this category of offenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is somewhat surprising to learn that in nearly half of the Florida
death penalty cases reviewed since 1972, the State supreme court has
found flaws or errors of such severity that it could not affirm the pen-
alty. This result is particularly common where a zealous trial judge has
overridden a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, but less so as
the number of victims increases. Further, the state supreme court has
found that trial judges are more likely to err in cases with white defend-
ant/female victim or black defendant/male victim. This finding under-
scores the necessity for state supreme court review: if the probability of
error or discrepant sentencing were low, such review would be less im-
portant. Given the stress that a death sentence causes for those person-
ally involved in the case and the expense entailed by the cumbersome
process, the high rate of erroneous death sentences is particularly
noteworthy.
33
The principal findings that remain unexplained are the effects of
defendant's race and victim's sex on outcomes. There are three possible
interpretations. First, these variables could be related to legally relevant
variables which were not measured in the study. For example, the cases
of white defendant/female victim (the least likely to be affirmed) might
be less heinous, involve less criminal intent, or have other characteristics
which the trial court did not take sufficiently into account. While our
interpretation of the state supreme court decisions does not lend support
32 LaFree, The Efect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Oftial Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. Soc.
REv. 842 (1980); Wolfgang & Riedel, supra, note 13.
33 R. JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE (1981); Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 241-46 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982).
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to this hypothesis, it is theoretically possible that any correlation could
be explained by a third unknown factor.34 Second, the trial courts, at
least in the eyes of the Florida Supreme Court, may tend to overreact in
sentencing certain groups of defendants. That is, the trial courts might
be more likely to impose a death sentence when a white man kills a
woman, even though the heinous quality of the offense and weight of
the evidence is similar in cases involving different defendant and victim
characteristics. The state supreme court's affirmation of a compara-
tively fewer number of these cases could be seen then as correcting this
earlier bias. However, given that trial courts tend to impose harsher
sentences on black defendants in death penalty cases,3 5 the "bias correc-
tion" hypothesis does not explain why cases with black defendants and
female victims are the most likely to be affirmed. Third, the state
supreme court may be treating black defendants with female victims
with disproportionate severity while the trial courts refrain from doing
so. This would suggest that a bias is introduced not by the trial courts,
but at the state appellate level. Further research is needed to investigate
these possibilities. For now, we can conclude only that the supreme
court's decisions support the trial court's death sentences differentially,
based in part on victim's sex and defendant's race.
While the identification of extra-legal correlates of decisions at one
point in the capital sentencing process is noteworthy, its principal im-
portance emerges in the context of comparison with other racially bi-
ased decisions made at earlier points. That is, although the death
penalty in Florida is given disproportionately to black defendants, 3 6 the
Florida Supreme Court is not correcting the discrepancy in its decisions
on direct appeals.3 7 In fact, the relationship between defendant's race
34 The defendant's prior conviction record would be one possible control variable, al-
though we are aware of no research which suggests that this record might vary with the
interaction between defendant's race and victim's sex. All the state supreme court decisions
were read to determine whether trial judges found that "[t]he defendant was previously con-
victed of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person," FLA. STAT. ANN., § 921.141(3) (b) (West 1973), as an aggravating circumstance, and
whether the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the use of that circumstance. We found that no
mention of any aggravating circumstances was made in 33 cases (including the 22 cases re-
manded for new trials). In 70 cases, the trial judge did not find prior convictions as an aggra-
vating circumstance. The Florida Supreme Court struck down a trial judge's finding of this
aggravating circumstance in five cases, ignored it in seven, and approved it in thirty. We
found no clear relationship between the presence of this aggravating circumstance and de-
fendant's race/victim's sex. Thus, our data present no evidence that the correlation we found
between supreme court decisions and these extra-legal factors could be explained by defend-
ant's prior record.
35 See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 4; Radelet, supra note 14.
36 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 4; Radelet, supra note 14; Zeisel, supra note 14.
37 To correct the earlier injustices against black defendants, especially those with white
victims, it would be necessary for the Florida Supreme Court to review more than just a small
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and outcome indicates the possibility that the supreme court is reinforc-
ing the biases against black defendants which may be observed at earlier
stages of the criminal justice process. The greatest impact of racial vari-
ables on the death sentence may be at the prosecutorial38 and sentenc-
ing stages, and these initial effects are then augmented at the appellate
stage. Thus, studies which examine only one point in the capital sen-
tence decision-making process39 may miss the cumulative picture and
incorrectly conclude that only small racial biases are present.
In sum, it is clear that either the state supreme court or, in its opin-
ion, the trial courts are not applying the death penalty consistently in
Florida. Furthermore, inconsistencies tend to parallel defendant's race
and victim's sex. The above data provide support for the hypothesis
that significant disparities continue to exist in the process through which
some convicted murderers are selected for execution. Because of the
high probability that the number of executions soon will increase dra-
matically, future studies will be necessary to expand the search for corre-
lates of post-sentencing relief to include executive clemency and federal
court decisions.
sample of homicide cases. That is, cases that do not result in a death sentence, no matter how
factually similar to death penally cases, do not automatically come to the attention of the
Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal. This presents a methodological paradox. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court is mandated to strike comparatively excessive sentences and to ensure
consistency and fairness in capital sentencing, but in attempting to do so it reviews and com-
pares only the small portion of cases which result in death sentences. Before any systematic
study had been done on race and the post-Furman imposition of the death penalty in Florida,
Justice Stewart stated, in his plurality opinion in Aoffitt: "[T]his problem is not sufficient to
raise a serious risk that the state capital-sentencing system will result in arbitrary and capri-
cious imposition of the death penalty." 428 U.S. at 259 n.16. Nonetheless, if the state
supreme court is to correct earlier biases, such as those involving defendant's and victim's
race, it must examine the potential death penalty cases in which a death sentence was not
imposed.
38 M. Radelet & G. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases (Sept.
1983) (unpublished manuscript).
39 For an overview, see C. L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981).
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